Recent Developments: United States v. Washington: Testimony Using a Computer Printout of Results of a Blood Sample Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause Because Such Results Are Not Statements of the Lab Technicians Who Ran the Tests, Are Not Hearsay Statements, and Are Not Testimonial by Polen, Melyssa
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 38
Number 1 Fall 2007 Article 15
2007
Recent Developments: United States v.
Washington: Testimony Using a Computer
Printout of Results of a Blood Sample Does Not
Violate the Confrontation Clause Because Such
Results Are Not Statements of the Lab Technicians
Who Ran the Tests, Are Not Hearsay Statements,
and Are Not Testimonial
Melyssa Polen
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Polen, Melyssa (2007) "Recent Developments: United States v. Washington: Testimony Using a Computer Printout of Results of a
Blood Sample Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause Because Such Results Are Not Statements of the Lab Technicians Who Ran
the Tests, Are Not Hearsay Statements, and Are Not Testimonial," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 38 : No. 1 , Article 15.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol38/iss1/15
RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON: TESTIMONY USING A 
COMPUTER PRINTOUT OF RESULTS OF A BLOOD 
SAMPLE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE BECAUSE SUCH RESULTS ARE NOT 
STATEMENTS OF THE LAB TECHNICIANS WHO RAN THE 
TESTS, ARE NOT HEARSAY STATEMENTS, AND ARE NOT 
TESTIMONIAL. 
By: Melyssa Polen 
In United States v. Washington, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that computer printouts of the results of a 
blood sample are not statements of the lab technicians who ran the 
tests, are not hearsay statements, and are not testimonial. United States 
v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 2007). Thus, a qualified 
third party may testify using the computer printout results without 
violating the Confrontation Clause or the hearsay rule. Id. at 227. 
Dwonne Washington ("Washington") was pulled over shortly after 
3:30 am on January 3, 2004, by a United States Park Police officer, 
Officer Hatch, who was patrolling the Baltimore-Washington 
Parkway. Washington was going thirty miles per hour in a fifty-five 
mile per hour zone when Officer Hatch turned on his siren and lights 
to pull Washington over. Instead of complying, Washington 
accelerated and decelerated, pulled off onto the shoulder and then 
pulled back onto the road, and continued to meander along the 
parkway with Officer Hatch pursuing his vehicle. Finally, another 
park police officer maneuvered his car in front of Washington's, 
forcing him to stop. When Washington did not respond to Officer 
Hatch's commands to show his hands or open his car door, he was 
removed from the car, placed in handcuffs, and asked basic questions 
to which he did not respond. Based on Washington's unresponsive 
demeanor and an odor of phencyclidine ("PCP"), Officer Hatch took 
Washington to a hospital where he agreed to give a blood sample for 
testing. The blood sample was sent to the Armed Forces Institute of 
Pathology for analysis of ethanol and other drugs. 
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The blood sample was subjected to "headspace gas 
chromatography" to check for ethanol and "immunoassay or 
chromatography" to check for amphetamines, barbiturates, 
benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates, and phencyclidine. 
These tests were conducted by three lab technicians operating under 
the protocols and supervision of Dr. Barry Levine ("Dr. Levine"), 
director of the lab and chief toxicologist. Using the raw data and 
graphs produced by the testing instruments, Dr. Levine issued a report 
stating that Washington's blood contained ethanol ("alcohol") and 
PCP. Based on this report, Washington was charged with driving 
under the influence, unsafe operation of a vehicle, and other Class B 
misdemeanors. 
At trial, Washington objected to Dr. Levine's testimony as an 
expert witness regarding the results of the blood test. Washington 
argued that he was entitled to confront the lab technicians who 
conducted the actual testing, and that Dr. Levine's testimony was 
inadmissible hearsay. Washington's objections were overruled by a 
magistrate judge, and Washington was found guilty and sentenced to 
sixty days in prison. The ruling was affirmed by the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt, and 
Washington then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit. 
On appeal, Washington argued that the computer-generated reports 
were "testimonial statements" of the lab technicians. Id. at 229. He 
objected to their hearsay statements being admitted by way of Dr. 
Levine's testimony, and argued that Levine's testimony was a 
violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause not to have the 
technicians in court for cross-examination. Id. The Fourth Circuit 
noted that while the Confrontation Clause requires that all criminal 
defendants be able to confront witnesses against them, a "witness" for 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause is defined as a declarant who 
made a "testimonial statement." Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004». In this case the "statements" were not made by 
any person, but by the machines which ran the blood tests. 
Washington, 498 F.3d at 230. The only testimony the technicians 
could have offered was that the test results showed that Washington's 
blood contained PCP and alcohol. Id. at 229-30. Since Dr. Levine 
was merely offering the same conclusions based on the test results, the 
Confrontation Clause was not violated. Id. at 230. 
Further, the Court pointed out that since the lab technicians did not 
make statements about whether the blood sample was positive for 
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alcohol or PCP, there would be no value in cross-examining them as 
they would only be able to refer to the same printouts Dr. Levine 
referred to in his testimony. Id. The Court noted that while 
Washington did not raise any concerns about the reliability of the 
machine or the chain of custody, such concerns were valid, but should 
be addressed through the process of authentication, not by a hearsay or 
Confrontation Clause analysis. Id. at 231. 
The Court elaborated on the point that statements made by 
machines "are not out-of-court statements made by declarants that are 
subject to the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 230. They looked to the 
definition of "statement" in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a), and 
found that the "statement" offered by the machine was made 
independent of human observation or reporting, and that only the 
machine, not the technicians, could provide facts about the chemical 
composition of Washington's blood. Washington, 498 F.3d at 230. 
They further determined that the test results could not be hearsay 
because hearsay requires an out-of-court declarant, and Federal Rule 
of Evidence 80 I (b) defines a declarant as a "person" who makes a 
statement. Washington, 498 F .3d at 231. Thus, because the data from 
the machines did not constitute testimonial hearsay statements, Dr. 
Levine's testimony using the data was not in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause or hearsay rule, and was properly admitted at 
trial. Id. at 232. 
The dissent argued that although the test results were computer-
generated, a substantial amount of human input is required and the 
technicians must be highly trained. Id. at 232-33 (Michael, J., 
dissenting). Furthermore, the technicians must follow a specific 
procedure which is subject to human error, and thus the test results 
"must be considered statements of the laboratory technicians for both 
evidentiary and Confrontation Clause purposes." Id. at 233-34. 
Furthermore, courts in other jurisdictions have consistently considered 
computer printouts to be hearsay statements admissible only under one 
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id. at 234 (citing United States v. 
Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1993) (computer printouts of 
lensometer readings); United States v. McKinney, 631 F.2d 569 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (blood test results); United States v. DeWater, 846 F.2d 528 
(9th Cir. 1988) (breathalyzer test result)). The majority responded to 
these arguments by noting that the dissent was mixing authentication 
issues with its argument about "statements" and observed that if the 
defendant wished to raise questions about how the machines had been 
set up, he was entitled to subpoena the lab technicians into court and 
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cross-examine them. Washington, 498 F.3d at 231 n.3 (majority 
opinion). The dissent also suggested that the lab test results were 
testimonial because their purpose was to establish or prove a past 
event that was relevant to later criminal prosecution. ld. at 234-35 
(Michael, J., dissenting). Finally, the dissent felt that the decision to 
confront the lab technicians should have been one for the defendant, 
not the court, to make. ld. at 235. 
The holding in this case will make it easier for litigants to introduce 
computer-generated results because such results will not be considered 
hearsay statements. However, as noted in the dissent, this result is at 
odds with other circuits. Therefore, unless and until the United States 
Supreme Court addresses this issue, it seems that defendants in 
Maryland's federal courts will be unable to confront those who 
directly conduct computer-generated tests. Defendants must raise the 
issue in terms of the reliability of the test, or handling or chain of 
custody of the sample. This ruling will also allow for any expert to 
interpret the results of a test, regardless of whether they actually 
conducted the test. Further, with the increasing importance of DNA 
tests and the development of new and novel scientific methods which 
can be used to evaluate evidence, the use of computer-generated tests 
at trials is certain to increase. Whether these tests are "testimonial" 
statements, and whether the machines or their operators may be 
considered "declarants" are issues which will surely develop, and 
which should be closely followed by practitioners. 
